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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Taylor Gil Caves pled guilty to a single count of 
burglary. At sentencing, the district court initially placed Mr. Caves on seven years of 
probation as part of a withheld judgment; however, after Mr. Caves violated his 
probation the court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed. 
The sentence was suspended and Mr. Caves was again placed on probation, but 
Mr. Caves violated his probation, and the district court revoked probation, but retained 
jurisdiction. Although he successfully completed his period of retained jurisdiction and 
was placed back on probation, Mr. Caves violated his probation again and the district 
court revoked his probation. On appeal, he contends that the district court erred in 
revoking his probation and in failing to reduce his sentence. Further, Mr. Caves 
contends that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal protection 
when it refused to augment the record with several necessary transcripts. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Around noon on April 22, 2008, eighteen year old Taylor Caves knocked on the 
front door of a house, and when there was no answer, Mr. Caves went around to the 
back of the house and entered the sun room. (Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI),1 p.66.) Mr. Caves was looking for items to take and then sell in order 
to pay some fines, and had chosen this house because it looked like no one was home. 
1 Appellant's use of the designation "PSI" includes the packet of documents grouped 
with the electronic copy of the PSI, including the original PSI, the Addendum to the PSI, 
Substance Abuse Evaluations, Reports of Probation Violations, and letters submitted in 
support of Mr. Caves. 
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(PSI, pp.66-67.) The homeowner walked in and saw Mr. Caves, and Mr. Caves 
immediately ran from the house without taking any items. (PSI, p.66.) 
Mr. Caves was charged by information with one count of burglary. (R., pp.26-
27.) 
On March 16, 2009, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Caves pled guilty to one 
count of burglary. (Tr., p.6, Ls.13-14, p.7, L.19 - p.8, L.1; R., pp.31-32.) As part of the 
plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend ten years, with three years fixed, with 
the district court retaining jurisdiction. (Tr., p.6, Ls.14-17.) The district court accepted 
the plea and ordered a Presentence Investigation. (Tr., p.18, Ls.16-17, p.19, Ls.11-
13.) The matter was set for sentencing on April 27, 2009. (Tr., p.19, LsA-5.) On 
April 27, 2009, the district court withheld judgment and placed Mr. Caves on probation 
for a period of seven years. (Tr., p.35, Ls.6-8; R., pA8.) Mr. Caves was also ordered to 
serve 120 days in jail, but this time could be commuted down to 90 days should 
Mr. Caves successfully complete two jail programs while in custody. (Tr., p.35, LS.8-
13.) The district court set the matter for review on September 21, 2009. (Tr., p.38, 
LsA-7; R., p.150.) The September 21, 2009 review hearing was continued to 
November 2, 2009 (R., p.58), and again to November 9, 2009 (R., p.59). Thereafter, 
additional review hearings were held on December 14, 2009 (R., p.60), April 19, 2010 
(R., p.61), July 19, 2010 (R., p.62), October 4, 2010 (R., pp.63, 64), during which the 
district court checked on Mr. Caves' situation to ensure that he complied with the terms 
and conditions of probation, particularly his job search. (See R., pp.60-64.) 
On September 20, 2012, Mr. Caves' probation officer imposed 25 days of 
discretionary jail time in response to several violations of the terms of his probation, 
those being: (1) admission to smoking marijuana 3-4 times per week over the past 90 
2 
days, (2) failing to attend treatment, (3) failing to maintain full time employment, (4) 
being charged with driving without privileges on May 5, 2010, (5) being charged with 
driving without privileges on May 9, 2010, (6) failing to appear for court on May 28, 
2010, (7) failing to appear for court on June 30, 2010, and (8) for receiving a speeding 
ticket infraction on March 3, 2010. (PSI, pp.22, 180.) 
However, immediately after his probation officer ordered Mr. Caves to serve 25 
days of discretionary jail time for the above offenses, Mr. Caves' probation officer then 
filed a Report of Probation Violation ten days later, on October 1, 2010.2 (PSI, pp.18-
21.) On October 7,2010, a Motion for Bench Warrant for Probation Violation was filed. 
(R., pp.65-66.) 
Mr. Caves admitted to violating four conditions of his probation and the district 
court revoked his probation and the withheld judgment, and it sentenced Mr. Caves to 
seven years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.95, 98-99.) However, the district court 
retained jurisdiction over Mr. Caves for up to 365 days. (R., pp.80, 95-96, 99.) 
Mr. Caves was successful on his rider, and the APSI recommended that Mr. Caves be 
placed back on supervised probation. (PSI, p.40.) The district court placed Mr. Caves 
back on probation for a period of seven years. (R., pp.1 02-1 03.) 
A second Motion for Probation Violation was filed on March 30, 2012. 
(R., pp.119-121.) Mr. Caves admitted that he violated the terms and conditions of his 
probation by: (1) failing to complete treatment; (2) consuming alcohol; (3) using 
2 The Report of Probation Violation simply restated the basis for the discretionary jail 
time; however, Mr. Caves had already been punished for the conduct constituting his 
probation violation, and it has not been alleged that he engaged in any additional 
conduct that would form the basis for the probation violation. (See PSI, pp.18-21; 
R., pp.65-66.) 
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marijuana; and (4) absconding from supervision. (R., pp.119-121, 128; Tr., p.39, L.7 -
pAD, L.18.) 
After Mr. Caves admitted that he violated the terms of his probation, the district 
court ordered a substance abuse evaluation. (R., p.128; Tr., pAD, Ls.21-23.) At 
Mr. Caves' probation violation disposition, the district court revoked his probation and 
executed the underlying sentence. (R., pp.129, 130-131; Tr., pA6, Ls.18-19.) 
Mr. Caves filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Order Revoking 
Probation, Judgment of Conviction and Order of Commitment. (R., pp.138-140.) 
On appeal, Mr. Caves filed a motion to augment the record on appeal with 
transcripts of hearings held between November 2, 2D09 and August 1, 2011. (Motion to 
Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, 
(hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.) The State objected to Mr. Caves' request for 
the transcripts, claiming that Mr. Caves failed to adequately explain how the transcripts 
were necessary to the issues on appeal. (Objection to "Motion to Augment and to 
Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof" (hereinafter, 
Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.i-4.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered 
an order denying Mr. Caves' motion. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to 
Suspend the Briefing Schedule, p.i.) 
Mr. Caves contends on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by 
failing to place him back on probation and by failing to reduce his sentence, sua sponte. 
Mr. Caves further argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and 
equal protection when it refused to augment the record with the necessary transcripts 
Mr. Caves requested to be created at the public's expense. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Caves' probation 
and executed his underlying sentence of seven years, with two years fixed? 
2. Was Mr. Caves denied due process and equal protection when the Idaho 





The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Caves' Probation And 
Executed The Suspended Sentence 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Caves asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his 
probation and executed his original sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, 
without any reduction. He asserts that the violations did not justify revoking probation, 
especially in light of the goals of rehabilitation and the fact that the protection of society 
could be best served by his continued supervision under the probation department. 
However, even if Mr. Caves' violations justified revoking his probation, the district court 
abused its discretion by not reducing his sentence sua sponte. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Caves' Probation 
And Executed His Sentence 
In light of the significant progress Mr. Caves made while on probation, his 
probation violations did not justify revoking probation. In a probation revocation 
proceeding, the district court addresses three issues: First, was a condition of probation 
violated? Second, does the violation justify revocation? Finally, if probation is revoked, 
what prison sentence should be imposed? State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 
(Ct. App. 2001). As to the first issue before the district court, Mr. Caves concedes that 
he violated conditions of his probation, as he admitted below that he had done so. 
(Tr., p.34, L.20 - p.37, L.1.) Mr. Caves took full responsibility for violating the terms of 
his probation. (Tr., p.39, L.13 - p.40, L.18.) 
When a defendant violates any of the terms of probation, the decision to revoke 
probation rests within the sound discretion of the district court. State v. Jones, 123 
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Idaho 315, 318 (Ct. App. 1993). Mr. Caves asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion in finding that his probation violations justified revocation. The district court 
was required to decide whether probation was achieving the goal of rehabilitation and 
whether probation was consistent with the protection of society. State v. Phillips, 113 
Idaho 176, 177 (Ct. App. 1987). Mr. Caves asserts that his continued probation would 
achieve the goals of his rehabilitation and the protection of society. 
Although Mr. Caves' violations were serious, they did not justify revoking his 
probation. Mr. Caves admitted that he violated the terms of his probation by: (1) failing 
to complete treatment; (2) consuming alcohol; (3) using marijuana; and (4) absconding 
from supervision. (R., pp.119-121, 128; Tr., p.39, L.7 - p.40, L.18.) However, 
Mr. Caves clearly has substance abuse issues; unfortunately he relapsed back to using 
marijuana and consuming alcohol. Mr. Caves recognizes that he has a problem and is 
highly motivated for treatment. (PSI, p.59.) Mr. Caves also came to the realization that 
the use of alcohol and marijuana are "ruining [his] future." (PSI, p.59.) 
Mr. Caves has finally realized that he needs to change his lifestyle. (PSI, p.60.) 
While on probation, Mr. Caves was employed at Bronco Motors performing detailing 
and reconditioning work. (PSI, p.61.) Mr. Caves was also attending college at the 
College of Western Idaho. (PSI, p.61.) Mr. Caves is eligible for rehire at Bronco Motors 
and wants to work and go back to school at the College of Western Idaho when he 
returns to the community. (Tr., p.44, Ls.1-3; PSI, p.61.) Mr. Caves is well aware that he 
needs to change his social group so that he is not spending time with persons using 
drugs and involved in illegal activity. (PSI, pp.60-61, 75.) The people Mr. Caves 
worked with and went to school with do not use drugs and are not involved in criminal 
activity. (PSI, pp.62-63.) Mr. Caves recognizes that his biggest barrier to maintaining a 
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sober lifestyle are social influences, and he knows that he needs to add positive peer 
influences to his life in order to be successful in recovery. (PSI, pp.63, 75.) 
Assuming arguendo the district court was justified in revoking Mr. Caves' 
probation, it should have reduced his sentence. The third question to be answered in a 
probation revocation proceeding is: what prison sentence should be imposed? State v. 
Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001). In answering this third question, the 
appellate courts examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the 
original judgment. State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055 (Ct. App. 1989). The Idaho 
Supreme Court has held that, where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant 
has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing 
the sentence. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 
100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Caves does not allege that his sentence exceeds the 
statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Caves 
must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive 
considering any view of the facts. 
Mr. Caves' entanglements with the legal system began not too long after his 
parents' divorce when he was 12 years old. (PSI, p.70.) Although Mr. Caves reported 
that his mother raised him until the time of the divorce, after the divorce, Mr. Caves' 
mother began drinking heavily. (PSI, p.70.) At that point Mr. Caves moved in with his 
father due to his mother's problematic drinking. 3 (PSI, p.70.) Mr. Caves was 
suspended from high school in the fall of 2006 for truancy, and his father enrolled him in 
a wilderness program. (PSI, p.69.) After he completed the program, he was sent to a 
3 Mr. Caves reported that there was an incident where his mother drove him to school 
while she was intoxicated; as a result, Mr. Caves' father was awarded custody of 
Mr. Caves and his two younger siblings. (PSI, p.70.) 
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boarding school for troubled youths in Montana, where he earned his high school 
diploma. (PSI, p.69.) Mr. Caves returned to Idaho after he turned 18 years old, and 
was not allowed back in his father's house. (PSI, pp.70, 80.) Mr. Caves' father paid for 
him to live in a motel for one month, after which Mr. Caves moved into his mother's 
home. (PSI, pp.70-71, 80.) Mr. Caves is currently 22 years old and has been using 
marijuana since the age of fourteen. (PSI, pp.55-56.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered 
as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. 
Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence 
based on Nice's lack of prior record and the fact that "the trial court did not give proper 
consideration of the defendant's alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing 
defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem." 
Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and 
alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct, could be a 
mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 (1981). Mr. Caves has 
been using marijuana and alcohol since he was fourteen years old. (PSI, p.56.) 
Mr. Caves has realized that H[m]arijuana has only brought [him] trouble in [his] life" and 
he is aware of the negative impact of his marijuana use on his life. (PSI, p.9.) To that 
effect, Mr. Caves completed both the Moral Reconation Therapy program (Active 
Behavioral Change) and the Substance Abuse Program while in the Ada County Jail, 
and planned to attend a cognitive self change class but was denied funding to attend 
the program. (PSI, pp.9, 10.) He is aware that marijuana use is one of the causes of 
his legal problems and he listed sobriety as a future goal. (PSI, p.10.) Mr. Caves looks 
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forward to having a secure future and realizes that need needs to form relationships 
with other sober people. (PSI, p.10.) 
One fact that should have received the attention of the district court is the fact 
that Mr. Caves has strong support from his family members. See State v. Shideler, 103 
Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the support of his 
family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts). Prior to his sentencing on this charge, 
Mr. Caves' mother and father assisted Mr. Caves in attending cognitive self-change and 
anti-theft classes. (Tr., p.28, Ls.8-11.) Mr. Caves' mother, father, stepmother, and his 
sister were all present at his sentencing to show their support of Mr. Caves. (Tr., p.27, 
Ls.9-12.) Mr. Caves' mother also wrote a letter of support to the court. (PSI, pp.79-81.) 
Mr. Caves has a supportive, stable family (PSI, p.76) whom he depends on but whom 
he also supports in turn. Mr. Caves' mother is ill with Stage 4 liver disease and 
Mr. Caves cared for her during the period of time he was on probation. (PSI, pA.) 
Mr. Caves' father is also very supportive of Mr. Caves; he has offered to obtain housing 
for Mr. Caves once he is released and intends to pay for Mr. Caves to attend college. 
(PSI, p.6.) Mr. Caves' father submitted a letter in support of Mr. Caves. (PSI, p.76.) 
Mr. Caves' father was present in the courtroom to show his support for his son at both 
Mr. Caves' sentencing and probation violation disposition hearing. (Tr., pA3, L.24 -
p.44, L.1.) 
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender 
should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." State v. 
Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 
402, 253 P.2d 203, 207 (1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 
Idaho 227 (1971 )); see also State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). This was 
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Mr. Caves' first felony charge. (PSI, p.75) In fact, he was eligible for a withheld 
judgment, although his subsequent probation violation resulted in a loss of that 
opportunity. 
The defendant in Hoskins pled guilty to two counts of drawing a check without 
funds. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673. In Nice, the defendant pled guilty to the charge of 
lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor. Nice, 103 Idaho at 90. In both Hoskins and 
Nice, the respective courts considered, among other important factors, that the 
defendants had no prior felony convictions. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673; Nice, 103 Idaho 
at 90. The Hoskins Court ultimately found that based upon the nature of the offense 
and the absence of any prior serious criminal record, the district court abused its 
discretion in imposing the sentence. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 675. 
Although Mr. Caves' employment history has been somewhat inconsistent, he 
has held several jobs for intervals of approximately six months at a time. (PSI, pp.7-8.) 
Further, Mr. Caves intends to study health care and plans to enroll in Boise State 
University or the College of Western Idaho to fulfill that goal. (PSI, p.7.) Idaho 
recognizes that good employment history should be considered a mitigating factor. See 
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); see also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 
(1982). 
Further, Mr. Caves has shown remorse for his conduct and taken full 
responsibility for violating the terms of his probation. (Tr., p.32, Ls.22-24, p.39, L.13 -
pAO, L.18.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant 
expresses remorse for his conduct. State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 
1991 ). 
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One Idaho case which addressed the issue of reducing a sentence where a 
defendant recognizes that he has a problem and expresses remorse was State v. 
Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991). In Alberts, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted 
that some leniency is required when the defendant has expressed "remorse for his 
conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other 
positive attributes of his character." Id. at 209. Mr. Caves has realized that "[m]arijuana 
has only brought [him] trouble in [his] life" and he is aware of the negative impact of his 
marijuana use on his life. (PSI, p.9.) Mr. Caves recognizes that his use of marijuana 
causes many problems and he is highly motivated for treatment. (PSI, p.59.) 
Mr. Caves is determined to lead a clean and sober life. (PSI, p.10.) Mr. Caves was 
embarrassed about committing the offense, submitting that he felt like an immature child 
and he chose the easy way to try to make money. (PSI, p.67.) Further, Mr. Caves 
regrets committing his crime. He reported feeling "very remorseful for what [he] did," 
and told the district court at sentencing that he did write a letter to the victims in the 
case but did not send the letter prior to sentencing due to a recommendation by law 
enforcement that he not contact the victims. (Tr., p.32, L.22 - p.33, L.7.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also reduced a defendant's term of imprisonment 
because the defendant expressed regret for what he had done. State v. Shideler, 103 
Idaho 593, 595 (1982). The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the prospect of Shideler's 
recovery from his poor mental and physical health, which included mood swings, violent 
outbursts, and drug abuse, coupled with his remorse for his actions, was so compelling 
that it outweighed the gravity of the crimes of armed robbery, assault with a deadly 
weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Id. at 594-95. 
Therefore, the court reduced Shideler's sentence from an indeterminate term not to 
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exceed twenty years to an indeterminate term not to exceed twelve years. Id. at 593. 
Like Shideler, Mr. Caves has a drug abuse problem, but also exhibited considerable 
remorse for his actions and truly desires to turn his life around. 
In light of all of the mitigating evidence that was presented to the district court 
that demonstrates Mr. Caves' significant rehabilitative potential the district court abused 
its discretion when revoked Mr. Caves' probation without reducing his sentence. 
II. 
Mr. Caves Was Denied Due Process And Equal Protection When The Idaho 
Supreme Court Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With Several Necessary 
Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
The United States Supreme Court has held that it is a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent defendant 
access to transcripts of trial proceedings which are relevant to issues the defendant 
intends to raise on appeal. The only way a state can constitutionally deny an indigent 
defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is 
irrelevant to the appeal. 
In this case, Mr. Caves filed a request to augment the record with several 
transcripts, including: six transcripts of review hearings in front of the district court in 
which the court was ascertaining whether Mr. Caves was maintaining employment and 
otherwise complying with the terms of his probation; a transcript of Mr. Caves' rider 
review hearing; a transcript of Mr. Caves' probation violation disposition hearing; and a 
transcript of Mr. Caves' probation violation admit/deny hearing.4 The State objected 
4 Appellant's Motion to Augment and Suspend mischaracterized the December 14, 2009 
and October 4, 2010 transcripts as being "admit/deny" hearings, rather than review 
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and this Court denied Mr. Caves' motion. On appeal, Mr. Caves is challenging the 
Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for the transcripts of the hearings. 
Mr. Caves asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issues addressed at 
the probation violation disposition hearing because Mr. Caves' performance on 
probation was closely monitored by the district court such that the contents of these 
hearings, which were mainly discussions had on the record between the district court 
and Mr. Caves regarding the status of Mr. Caves' performance on probation as well as 
other probation related hearings, are decidedly relevant to the district court's decision to 
revoke Mr. Caves' on probation. (See R., pp.59-64, 80, 95, 102.) These hearings are 
particularly relevant where Mr. Caves was later found to have violated his probation due 
to noncompliance with probationary terms that were discussed during these hearings. 
(See, i.e., R., p.63 (discussing classes Mr. Caves was to take) and PSI, pp.18-21 (a 
probation violation for failing to attend classes).) Information was provided to the court 
at these hearings, potentially including admissions by Mr. Caves, such that the note 
from October 4, 2010 reflects that "Ct notes things are not going well" and that the 
"State will be filing a PV." (R., p.64.) Information gleaned by the district court at these 
review hearings more than likely impacted its decision regarding the disposition on 
June 4, 2012. 
As the district court had evidence before it relating to the entirety of Mr. Caves' 
performance on probation when it entered a disposition on June 4, 2012, all information 
or discussions relating to Mr. Caves' probation performance are relevant to the 
circumstances surrounding the court's decision not to reinstate Mr. Caves on probation 
hearings. (Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in 
Support Thereof, p.2.) 
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or further reduce his sentence. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Caves 
due process and equal protection by denying his request for these transcripts. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The Court exercises free review in determining whether the constitutional 
requirements of due process have been satisfied. State v. Tucker, 138 Idaho 296 
(Ct. App. 2003). 
C. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Caves Due Process And Equal 
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The 
Requested Transcripts 
The Constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 10. CONST. art. 
I §13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servo of Durham County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981 ). 
State V. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United 
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh V. State, 
Dept. of Health and Welfare ex reI. Cabal/ero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant has a statutory right to appeal. See I.C. § 19-2801. 
Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, such transcript 
must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court 
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rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates the production of 
transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. I.C.R. 5.2(a). Further, 
"[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court .... " Id. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to be 
prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as 
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these 
cases. The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal 
protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent 
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated. See Griffin v. Illinois 351 
U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that in order to satisfy the constitutional mandates of both due 
process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be provided with a record 
which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review); see also Bums v. Ohio, 
360 U.S. 252 (1959) ("[O]nce the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal 
cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that procedure 
because of their poverty."). However, the second theme limits the states' obligation-
the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless some or all 
of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous. See Washington v. Draper, 
372 U.S. 487, 495 (1963) ("[P]art or all of the stenographic transcript in certain cases 
will not be germane to consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to 
expend its funds unnecessarily in such circumstances."); see also Mayer v. City of 
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Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (holding that a defendant need only make a colorable 
argument that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal, then it 
becomes the State's burden to prove that the requested items are not necessary for the 
appeal). 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 606 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
Whether the transcripts of the requested proceedings were before the district 
court at the time of the probation revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether 
the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal because in reaching a sentencing 
decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the 
hearing from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge 
gained from its own official position and observations. Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 
373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900,907 (1983) (recognizing 
that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court 
heard during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing that the court 
could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has 
observed in the courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein 
involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving sentencing 
court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a previously 
dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he 
already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior hearings 
were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon the information it 
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already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the decision to 
revoke probation. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, 
Docket No. 39057, 2012 Opinion No. 38 (Ct. App. 2012), review denied (Nov. 29, 2012), 
which addressed the foregoing argument. In Morgan, the defendant pleaded guilty and 
was placed on probation. Id. at 1. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted 
to violating the terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation but 
retained jurisdiction. Id. at 1-2. After he completed his rider, the district court placed the 
defendant on probation. Id. at 2. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his 
probation and the district court revoked probation. Id. The defendant appealed from 
the district court's second order revoking probation. Id. 
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with 
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the 
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal 
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district 
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 2-3. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary 
for the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second probation 
violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its 
revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 4. 
However, the decision in Morgan appears to be out of sync with previous case 
law on this issue and the decision in State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 
2009 ) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of 
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probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the 
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was 
imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation 
of probation." (emphasis added)). The Court's decision in Hanington is consistent with 
prior Idaho case law which stands for the proposition that, in reaching a sentencing 
decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the 
hearing from which the appeal is filed. See State v. Whitt/e, 145 Idaho 49, 52 (Ct. App. 
2007) (recognizing that sentence review is not based solely upon the facts existing 
when the sentence was imposed, but that the court also examines all of the 
circumstances bearing on the decision to revoke probation); see also State v. Adams, 
115 Idaho 1053, 1055 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the reviewing court examines "the 
entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment"); State v. 
Schultz, 149 Idaho 285,289 (Ct. App. 2010) (same). 
Further, while Morgan does directly deal with the issues raised in this appeal, it is 
distinguishable because, in Mr. Caves' case, he is challenging not only the order 
revoking probation, but also the length of his sentence, which requires an analysis of 
the district court's sentencing rationale. 
Appellate counsel for Mr. Caves requested several additional items necessary to 
provide an adequate record on appeal. The substance of the requested hearings is not 
known to appellate counsel, as the minutes provided in the record do not indicate the 
full extent of what was discussed. (R., pp.59-64, 80, 95, 102.) However, the district 
court did have knowledge of any statements made by Mr. Caves or the prosecutor 
regarding Mr. Caves' attempts or challenges in meeting the terms and conditions of 
probation. Such information would be relevant to the district court's decision to revoke 
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Mr. Caves' probation without reducing his sentence sua sponte. Without access to the 
transcripts, Mr. Caves is unable to address on appeal whether the district court erred in 
not further considering Mr. Caves' progress on probation when it revoked his probation 
and imposed the original sentence. 
Further, Had Mr. Caves failed to request the transcripts at issue, a presumption 
would then be applied whereby any missing pertinent parts of the record would be 
presumed to support the actions of the trial court. State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 
(Ct. App. 1999) ("It is well established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an 
adequate record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of 
error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are 
presumed to support the actions of the trial court."); State v. Rundle, 107 Idaho 936, 937 
(Ct. App. 1984) ("When a discretionary decision related to sentencing is challenged on 
appeal, the appellant bears the burden of presenting a sufficient record to evaluate the 
merits of the challenge."). Thus Mr. Caves must meet his burden by supplying the 
necessary record. 
In sum, the decision to deny Mr. Caves' request for the transcripts will render his 
appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcripts support the 
district court's sentencing decisions. This functions as a procedural bar to the review of 
Mr. Caves' appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore, Mr. Caves should 
either be provided with the requested transcripts or the presumption should not be 
applied. 
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D. By Failing To Provide Mr. Caves With Access To The Requested Transcripts, 
The Court Has Denied Him The Opportunity To Receive Effective Assistance Of 
Counsel On Appeal 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated and made applicable 
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme 
Court reasoned that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due 
process that the denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants 
the right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of 
Douglas was clarified as being the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
According to the United States Supreme Court, if counsel is to be effective, 
appellate counsel must make a conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in 
support of the best arguments to be made. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 
(1967), held that the constitutional requirements of substantial equality and fair process 
"can only be attained where counsel acts as an active advocate on behalf of his client .. 
. . [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he support his client's interest's to the best 
of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this 
case, the lack of access to the requested transcripts has prevented appellate counsel 
from making a conscientious examination of the case and has potentially prevented 
appellate counsel from determining whether there is an additional issue to raise, or 
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whether there is factual support either in favor of any argument made or undercutting an 
argument. Therefore, Mr. Caves has not obtained full review of the trial proceedings 
based on the merits and has been deprived of an opportunity to receive effective 
assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate counsel can 
neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be presented on 
appeal, nor consider all issues that might affect the district court's decision to relinquish 
Mr. Caves' probation. Counsel is also unable to advise Mr. Caves on the probable role 
the transcripts may play in the appeal. 
Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access to the requested 
transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary 
supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Caves respectfully requests that this Court place him back on probation. 
Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new 
probation violation disposition hearing or that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate. 
DATED this 14th day of December, 2012. 
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